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RESTITUTION AND FINAL PAYMENT
ANDREW KULL*
What is the relation between common-law restitution and the rules de-
termining "final payment"? The expression is ambiguous, because "final
payment" might mean two different things entirely. The first kind of final-
ity determines the time at which the payment transaction will be regarded
as fully executed, in the sense that it gives the payee rights to the money as
against the payor. Until payment is final in this sense, a person who had
previously been intending to pay is free to change his mind and reverse
whatever steps he might have taken so far: put his hand back in his pocket,
stop payment on a check, reverse an entry on a ledger, or revoke a provi-
sional settlement. After payment is final in this initial sense, the money
belongs to the payee, and the payor needs a legal remedy to get it back.
Restitution is interested in this first kind of final payment, because final
payment in this sense is where restitution begins.
This was the issue in Chambers v. Miller,' an English case from 1862,
in which a bank teller inadvertently paid £150 on a check drawn on insuffi-
cient funds. Unfortunately for the teller, he realized his mistake a moment
after he had pushed the sheaf of five-pound notes through the window to
the customer. The teller demanded the money back while the customer was
still standing at the window, counting the notes, but the customer refused to
surrender it. The customer was then invited into the bank "parlor," where
he continued for a period of several hours to resist repeated invitations to
give back the money. The bankers eventually reacquired the money by
force: this was held to be conversion. If they wanted their money back at
this point, they needed a claim in restitution.
Whether restitution would have been available in this case depends on
a second kind of finality rule; this is why the two kinds of "final payment"
are so often interlinked. Because the bank in Chambers v. Miller made a
mistaken payment-a payment that the payor was not obligated to make
and (if properly advised) would not have made-the bank was prima facie
entitled to recover the money from the payee. The question then becomes
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Reporter, Restatement Third, Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment.
1. (1862) 13 C.B.(N.S.) 125, 143 Eng. Rep. 50 (C.P.).
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whether some rule of restitution law gives the payee an affirmative defense.
If it does, the mistaken payment is "final" in the second (and somewhat
figurative) sense that restitution will be denied. On the facts of Chambers v.
Miller, the customer would have been protected against the bank's restitu-
tion claim by the rule of Price v. Neal 2-at least if the customer was un-
aware that he was presenting a bad check.
Chambers v. Miller is thus a good illustration of the way payment
cases sometimes involve both finality issues in succession. First, a court
must decide whether payment has actually been made. If it has, the next
question is whether restitution is available to get the payment back by legal
process. Put this way, the two phases of the inquiry are not that hard to
distinguish; the two modes of "final payment" would never have been con-
fused-it seems safe to say-but for the fact that two different U.C.C.
committees, preparing the original versions of Articles 3 and 4, unfortu-
nately decided to use the words "final" and "payment" to refer to both of
these distinct ideas. 3 Post-revision, the confusion between these two kinds
of "final payment" is not so easily blamed on the U.C.C., but cases con-
tinue to arise in which the relation between the two kinds of finality ap-
pears to be misunderstood or ignored. The result is that some payors obtain
restitution when it should be denied, and some are denied restitution when
it should be available.
A rule that determines when payment has been completed is relevant
to the availability of restitution for mistaken payment, because it deter-
mines whether the payor must resort to restitution (as opposed to self-help)
to get the money back. So the first cases that interest us are those in which
restitution for mistaken payment might not be available. The payee has a
defense if he took payment for value and without notice of the payor's
mistake, or if he changed position on receipt of the payment.4 Conversely,
2. (1762) 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B.) (Mansfield, C.J.) (denying restitution to a
drawee who pays a draft bearing the forged signature of the drawer).
3. Pre-revision section 4-213(1) (like revised section 4-215) refers to the circumstances in which
"[a]n item is finally paid" to identify the point in a payment transaction at which the payee obtains
rights to the money against the payor. Unfortunately, pre-revision section 3-418 described the affirma-
tive defenses to common-law restitution-these consist mostly of the rule of Price v. Neal-by saying
that in such cases "payment or acceptance . .. is final." The apparent parallel wording of the two sec-
tions naturally invited confusion. The problem was eventually sorted out by decisions such as National
Savings & Trust Co. v. Park Corp., 722 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1983), and Demos v. Lyons, 376 A.2d 1352
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977). Revised section 3-418 (1990) expanded the statutory account of the
payor's restitution claim and strengthened the official comments to warn against the previous misunder-
standing. The pre-revision "final payment fallacy" is further discussed in text accompanying note 24
infra.
4. This is the way the answer would be stated as a matter of common law. See RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION § 33 (1937); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 6,
cmt. h (tent. draft 1, 2001). Compare U.C.C. § 3-418(c) (2005) with id. § 3-418 cmt. 3 (indicating that
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if the payment has not yet been completed when the payor changes his
mind-supposing the teller in Chambers v. Miller remembers to verify the
account just before he hands over the money, instead of just after-the fact
that the payee would have had an iron-clad defense to restitution no longer
matters.
This two-step analysis is nicely illustrated by DeLuca v. BancOhio
National Bank, Inc.,5 involving a check for $75,000, the drawer of the
check (an elderly lawyer in failing health), and the payee (his long-time
secretary). Both the lawyer and the secretary had accounts at the payor
bank. The secretary presented the $75,000 check for deposit in her account,
informing the teller she needed immediate access to the money. After veri-
fying that the balance of the lawyer's account was more than enough to
cover the check, the teller suggested that the secretary could get available
funds more quickly if the transaction were recorded as if the check had
been cashed and the cash deposited. The deposit slip was prepared accord-
ingly, though the teller and the secretary naturally did not bother to pass
$75,000 in currency back and forth across the counter. The secretary's
sense of urgency was explained when it transpired, shortly thereafter, that
the check in question had been made out to her and signed by the lawyer
with the amount left blank; that she had been at his bedside during his final
illness; and that in the hours after the lawyer's death, she had (following his
dying instructions, or so she said) gone to the office, found the check in her
name, completed it in the amount of $75,000, and presented it for deposit.
When these facts came to light, the bank reversed the $75,000 credit to the
secretary's account and paid the money instead to the lawyer's estate. 6
In subsequent litigation between the secretary and the bank, the first
question was whether the check had been finally paid in the ambiguous
transaction between the secretary and the teller. The bank argued that the
check had merely been taken for deposit, not paid in cash; on this view, the
credit to the secretary's account was merely a provisional settlement that
the bank properly revoked prior to its midnight deadline.7 If the bank was
right in this contention, which was not implausible, the significant point for
our purposes is that the bank would thereby succeed in recovering the
funds (to the extent it ever parted with them) without recourse to a legal
the availability of the defense depends on the payee's having "no reason to know that the check was
paid by mistake when payment was received"). The statute was so interpreted in Morgan Guaranty
Trust Co. v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n, 804 F.2d 1487, 1496 (9th Cir. 1986), and Bank Leumi
Trust Co. v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 349, 353-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
5. 598 N.E.2d 781 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
6. Id. at 782-83.
7. Id. at 785; see U.C.C. § 4-301(b).
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claim in restitution. The bank in that case would not need to show that its
payment was induced by fraud or mistake, nor would it need to refute the
secretary's affirmative defenses, because the secretary never acquired
rights to the money against the bank.
The Ohio Court of Appeals took the better view (I think) that what
took place at the counter between the teller and the secretary was equiva-
lent to the payment and subsequent deposit of $75,000 cash. 8 This decision
did not necessarily change the outcome of the litigation, but it meant that
the bank had to establish a claim in restitution that would be good against
the secretary. On the facts of DeLuca this is probably not difficult, whether
the restitution claim is described in common-law or U.C.C. terms;9 but a
case that moves to this second phase of the analysis can easily come out the
other way. Thus, if the bank's mistake had been to "cash" in the same way
a check given for value, but drawn on insufficient funds, rather than a
check that was completed after the death of the drawer, the threshold deci-
sion that the check has been paid means that the bank will bear the loss-
not because "final payment" forecloses restitution, but because the payee of
such a check will have an affirmative defense to the bank's restitution
claim.10
If a court gets the first step wrong and rules erroneously that a final
payment is not "final," the result is likely to be restitution via self-help--
because the bank teller has retaken the money by force, or the depositary
bank has reversed a prior credit to its customer's account. The error might
still be immaterial if the case is one in which the payor would have been
entitled to recover the money anyway by an action in restitution. But it
changes the outcome if the case is one in which common-law restitution
would have allowed the payee to keep the money.
The consequences for restitution of this first kind of error are illus-
trated by a recent case involving a professional litigant named Robert J.
Triffin. Mr. Triffin is a 1990 law school graduate who has thus far failed to
obtain admission to the bar, leading to extensive litigation with Pennsyl-
8. DeLuca, 598 N.E.2d at 787.
9. At common law, the bank would argue that the secretary's completion and presentation of the
check was fraudulent; alternatively, that the bank paid by mistake and that the secretary (as a donee)
had no affirmative defense to restitution. Within the U.C.C. framework, the same result is reached
through sections 3-418(b) and (c). The court in DeLuca held that the bank could recover the amount of
the check from the secretary for breach of her presentment warranty that the check had not been altered.
Id. at 789; see U.C.C. § 3-417(a)(2). But it is questionable whether the bank could actually establish
damages for breach of warranty in the amount of the check (section 3-417(b)), inasmuch as the check
(even if fraudulently completed) could properly have been charged by the bank to the account of its
deceased customer. See U.C.C. §§ 3-407(c), 4-405(a).
10. For a well-known case presenting these facts, see Kirby v. First & Merchants National Bank,
168 S.E.2d 273 (Va. 1969).
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vania and New Jersey officials over questions of character and fitness."l He
has carried on a high-profile U.C.C. practice nevertheless, representing
himself in transactions in which he purchases dishonored negotiable in-
struments from check-cashing agencies, then sues to enforce them against
drawers or payor banks. Triffin generally has the better side of the legal
issues involved in these negotiable-instrument cases, and he has probably
done more than any other individual to defend the vitality of the "shelter
principle" in American commercial law. 12 His occasionally unfriendly
reception in the New Jersey courts presumably has something to do with
the rancorous litigation surrounding his bar admission.
The case of Triffin v. Mellon PSFS13 is a modem-day version of
Chambers v. Miller-in which the teller tried to snatch back the bank-
notes--except that the New Jersey courts eventually let the bank get away
with it. Forged checks in the amounts of $335 and $365, purportedly drawn
on the account of a Burger King franchisee at Mellon Bank, were cashed
by an entity known as Check Cashing Services and deposited with First
Union for collection. Mellon paid the checks on presentment but learned
from its customer, perhaps two weeks later, that the checks were forgeries.
Two weeks later still, Mellon recredited Burger King's account and re-
turned the checks to First Union. First Union charged them back to the
account of Check Cashing, and Check Cashing sold them to Triffin, pre-
sumably at a healthy discount.
Triffin's lawsuit against Mellon involved an important U.C.C. version
of "final payment." Mellon had paid the forged checks because it "made a
provisional settlement for the item and failed to revoke the settlement in the
11. See In re Triffin, 701 A.2d 907 (N.J. 1997) (recounting various episodes in Triffin's career to
that point); Triffin v. Nix, No. 93-5519, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5407 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 1994), affd, 43
F.3d 1463 (3d Cir. 1994); Triffin v. McGinley, No. 92-3255, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9666 (E.D. Pa.
July 9, 1992); Triffin v. Pettit, No. 90-7882, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6100 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 1991); see
also Triffin v. DiSalvo, 643 A.2d 118 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding Triffin to the rules governing
attorney conduct even though he is not a lawyer, since he holds himself out as an attorney).
12. Triffin's single most notable contribution has been his successful suit to enforce some stolen
money orders that had been fraudulently completed and negotiated to a holder in due course, then sold
to Triffin after dishonor. Triffin v. Dillabough, 716 A.2d 605 (Pa. 1996). The opinion for the majority
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court contains an unusually lucid explanation of the important issues of
negotiability raised by the case-not just the "shelter principle" allowing Triffin to enforce the instru-
ments, but why negotiability was not destroyed by a legend on the back of the instruments to the effect
that "This money order will not be paid if it has been altered or stolen." id. at 609; see also Triffin v.
Cigna Ins. Co., 687 A.2d 1045, 1046-47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (transferee from holder in
due course may enforce against drawer checks previously dishonored on drawer's order to stop pay-
ment).
13. The decision by the trial court is unreported. The judgment against Triffin was subsequently
affd on other grounds, 855 A.2d 2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), motion to reconsider denied, 858
A.2d I (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), affd on other grounds sub nom. Triffin v. TD Banknorth,
N.A., 920 A.2d 649 (N.J. 2007).
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time and manner permitted by statute," 14 namely, within the U.C.C.'s mid-
night deadline. 15 This meant that Mellon was not entitled to self-help resti-
tution some four weeks later, when it sought and obtained a refund from
First Union. Rather, Mellon needed a valid claim in restitution if it was
going to recover the funds it had paid by mistake. Of course, restitution
would not be available against First Union, Check Cashing, or anyone else
who had taken the forged checks in good faith and for value. The rule of
Price v. Neal puts this loss on Mellon, unless it can find a payee (like the
forger) who is not entitled to an affirmative defense.
16
Triffin's attempt to recover the funds from Mellon-together with a
handful of parallel lawsuits against other banks, on similar facts-was ul-
timately derailed by the New Jersey courts, when they embraced the dubi-
ous proposition that a payor bank that has missed its midnight deadline is
liable to the original payee and to collecting banks, but not to an assignee
who purchases the check with notice of dishonor. 17 The idea that there
could be a nonassignable right to payment of a negotiable instrument-a
right that would be good in the hands of Check Cashing or First Union, but
not assignable by them to others-is so obviously contrary to commercial
principles that we might almost imagine this was a special rule for instru-
ments assigned in the State of New Jersey to Robert J. Triffin. 18 Indeed, the
14. Id. at 7 n.4 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:4-215(a)).
15. U.C.C. §§ 4-215(a)(3), 4-302(a)(1) (2005).
16. In U.C.C. terms, Mellon had no recourse via the presentment warranties because there was no
suggestion that either Check Cashing or First Union knew that the checks were forged. See id. § 3-
417(a)(3) & cmt. 3 (explaining that this provision carries forward the rule of Price v. Neal, (1762) 3
Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B.)).
17. See Triffin v. Bridge View Bank, 750 A.2d 136, 138 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). New
Jersey's eventual conclusion that rights derived from a bank's missing its midnight deadline are nonas-
signable emerges from a series of intertwined Triffin cases that resist convenient citation. The nonas-
signability idea, first adopted in Triffin v. Bridge View Bank was the basis of the original (unreported)
ruling against Triffin in Triffin v. Mellon PSFS. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court on this
point (expressly rejecting the reasoning of Trijin v. Bridge View Bank), 855 A.2d at 5-6, but held that
Triffin lost anyway (as will be related in the text). Meanwhile, two more Triffin cases (eventually
known as Triffin v. TD Banknorth and Triffin v. Wachovia) had been dismissed at trial on the theory of
Triffin v. Bridge View Bank. A different panel of the Appellate Division consolidated these two cases
for appeal; considered and rejected the views on assignability expressed in Triffin v. Mellon PSFS; and
affirmed the dismissals on the ground that rights based on the midnight deadline are nonassignable.
Triffin v. TD Banknorth, 2006 WL 1752166 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 28, 2006). The Supreme
Court granted certification to resolve the conflict between the different panels of the Appellate Division
and eventually gave its express approval to the nonassignability rule of Triffin v. Bridge View Bank.
Triffin v. TD Banknorth, N.A., 920 A.2d 649, 650 (N.J. 2007).
18. The New Jersey decisions rejecting the possibility of assignment to Triffin rely on decisions
by two other courts that could easily have been distinguished in favor of a more sympathetic assignee.
In both American Title Insurance Co. v. Burke & Herbert Bank & Trust Co., 813 F. Supp. 423, 427-28
(E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 25 F.3d 1038 (4th Cir. 1994), and Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. United
American Bank, 21 F. Supp. 2d 785, 792-94 (W.D. Tenn. 1998), the courts were concerned with a
fundamentally different question: whether sureties who had paid the fraud losses of their insureds
should be subrogated to rights that their insureds might have asserted against payor banks that had
[Vol 83:2
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Appellate Division in Triffin v. Mellon PSFS had properly identified and
rejected this attack on the basic shelter principle. 19 But after finding that
rights to final payment based on late return were fully assignable, the in-
termediate court in Triffin v. Mellon PSFS blandly announced that "the
evidence does not give rise to any inference that Mellon might have failed
to meet the midnight deadline."' 20 Because Mellon-as previously noted-
only discovered the forgeries some two weeks after it had paid the checks,
the court's reasoning on this point is frankly baffling. Triffin moved for
reconsideration, pointing to evidence that Mellon had stipulated at some
point that the checks in question were presented on August 23 and returned
on October 1. The court issued a further opinion, acknowledging that "Mel-
lon paid the checks when presented and only later... pursue[d] reim-
bursement," but persisting in its prior determination that these facts were
not "conclusive as to the alleged midnight deadline violation."'21
There are some obvious things wrong with this version of final pay-
ment via the midnight deadline. But the interesting feature of the error has
to do with the relation between final payment and restitution-the same
two-step analysis of the problem that we saw in the Chambers and DeLuca
cases. Rejecting Triffin's claims that Mellon was liable for missing its
midnight deadline, the court added the following observations:
[A] bank's rights with respect to a paid item are not permanently fixed
when the clock strikes twelve.... [W]hile the bank's obligations are or-
dinarily fixed upon making "final payment," as defined by [U.C.C. sec-
tion 4-215], the bank may still seek reimbursement even after it has
"finally paid" an item, [U.C.C. section 3-418] .... Accordingly, even if
we were to accept the stipulation on its face and ignore all the other evi-
dence in the record, as plaintiff mistakenly argues, the stipulation re-
mains entirely consistent with Mellon's exercise of a right of
reimbursement pursuant to [section 3-418] and not a breach of the mid-
night deadline.22
missed their midnight deadlines in connection with the fraudulent activities that led to the insured
losses. The issue in such cases is a difficult question at the margins of insurance subrogation: the extent
to which it is equitable that a compensated surety be permitted to recoup amounts paid under fidelity or
performance bonds from innocent persons against whom their insureds might otherwise have had
recourse. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 26, cmt. f
(tent. draft 2, 2002). The decision to deny subrogation in the two cases cited is clearly defensible, since
the question in such circumstances necessarily turns on a difficult balancing of equities. Read in con-
text, the cases do not support the conclusion that rights against a payor bank that misses its midnight
deadline are somehow not assignable at all.
19. Triffin v. Mellon PSFS, 855 A.2d at 5-6.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Triffin v. Mellon PSFS, 858 A.2dat 2.
22. Id. at 3.
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This comment is both right and wrong at the same time. The court
notes correctly that "final payment" is not the end of the story: a bank that
has made final payment is remitted to a legal claim for "reimbursement"
(alias restitution), codified in this context by U.C.C. sections 3-417 and 3-
418. But the court fails to see that the rules of restitution do not work prop-
erly without the rules governing final payment. Mellon Bank's claim under
section 3-418 would have failed against either First Union or Check Cash-
ing, because both parties (we are assuming) had taken the forged checks in
good faith and for value. So the net result in Triffin v. Mellon was success-
ful (but wrongful) self-help restitution by Mellon Bank. Because the New
Jersey Supreme Court held against Triffin on the issue of assignability,
these statements about Mellon's "right of reimbursement" received no fur-
ther review.
The same misunderstanding can also run the other way. If a court fails
to see the difference between "final payment" and restitution, and con-
cludes that "final payment" means "no restitution," the result is too little
restitution rather than too much.
The principal illustrations on this side of the problem belong to an ob-
solete controversy over the meanings of the original Articles 3 and 4, sur-
rounding what I will call the "final payment fallacy." The fallacy, in its
purest form, was the view that when original Article 4 referred to the
means by which items were "finally paid," and went on to specify that "fi-
nal payment" made a bank "accountable" for those items, 23 the payments
thus designated "final" were not subject to restitution at all. This meant that
the entire common law of restitution for payments induced by fraud or
mistake had been eliminated without acknowledgment--except to the ex-
tent that some of this law was captured in the presentment warranties-as
regards "items" paid by banks. Because the great majority of disputed cases
involved payments that became final when a payor bank missed its mid-
night deadline, the more usual form of the final payment fallacy tended to
describe the elimination of restitution as a penalty purposely imposed on
"tardy banks" and (as such) a critical element of the statutory scheme for
achieving speed and certainty in the bank collection process. 24
The controversy is obsolete because the 1990 revisions to Articles 3
and 4 make it clear that "final payment" and "accountability" under Article
4 do not mean "no restitution," and I have been unable to find any decision
23. See U.C.C. § 4-213(1) (1989).
24. For the most sympathetic account of the final payment fallacy, see 1 BARKLEY CLARK &
BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS § 6.02[2][n] (rev.
ed. 2006). Most previous adherents have long since recanted, See, e.g., 2 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 20-3 (4th ed. 1995).
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squarely to the contrary under the revised statutes. 25 But the roots of the
final payment fallacy extend much deeper than a mere U.C.C. revision can
reach. Beyond the textual misunderstandings to which the original versions
evidently gave rise, the courts and commentators that were prepared to
jettison almost the whole law of restitution for mistaken payment were
predisposed to read the statutes that way because they regarded this part of
our partially-codified commercial law with suspicion and mistrust. By and
large they still do. There are many reasons for this state of affairs, most of
them beyond the narrow scope of the present topic. But part of the explana-
tion brings us back to our starting point, which is the failure to distinguish
final payment and restitution, and to see how they work together.
The consistent refrain accompanying the final payment fallacy in all
its forms is that our banking system "could not function.effectively if banks
were not required to make prompt and effective decisions on whether to
pay or dishonor checks. '26 It is thought that "[i]f banks were allowed to
retain instruments beyond the time specified in the U.C.C. and avoid liabil-
ity on equitable grounds, finality and certainty would not exist in the busi-
ness world."'27 The fear, in short, is that the mere possibility of restitution
for mistaken payment runs counter to the efficient working of the payment
system. Precisely how it has this effect is never spelled out.
To begin with, the courts that are worried about the breakdown of our
banking system if the midnight deadline is undermined by restitution seem
to miss the point that the checks in almost every midnight deadline case
have already been paid. This is the effect of "final payment" under section
4-215(a)(3). ("Accountability" under section 4-302 actually has nothing to
do with it, because a payor bank only becomes "accountable" for a check it
has managed to avoid paying.28) Of course, if a payee or depositary bank is
25. The closest thing to an exception might be Channel Equipment Co. v. Community State Bank,
996 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999), in which the court states emphatically that payor banks under
section 4-302 are "strictly accountable for the value of checks that they fail to return by their midnight
deadline, subject only to the defenses of fraud and breach of presentment warranty expressly set forth
by section 4.302(b)." Id. at 379. But the court then allows the defendant bank to resist liability based on
late return of n.s.f. checks by asserting what is in effect a restitutionary counterclaim: because the
payees had previously obtained payment of the debts for which the checks in question were issued,
making the bank liable for the amount of the checks (because of late return) would unjustly enrich the
payees at the expense of the bank. Although the court deprecates the idea that payor banks might "use
equitable principles to contest their accountability under section 4.302 for checks they have failed to
return by their midnight deadline," id., the logic of the bank's implicit counterclaim is that of equitable
subrogation, analogous to the remedy described in U.C.C. section 4-407.
26. Town & Country State Bank v. First State Bank, 358 N.W.2d 387, 395 (Minn. 1984).
27. State & Sav. Bank v. Meeker, 469 N.E.2d 55, 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
28. The point is emphasized by one of the official comments to Article 3:
The second situation [in which a check is dishonored] arises if the drawee bank has made
such a [provisional] settlement and does not return the check or give notice of dishonor or
nonpayment within the midnight deadline. In that case, the settlement becomes final payment
2008]
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suing a payor bank for missing its midnight deadline, we can infer that the
payor bank has somehow managed to get this payment back; but that only
means that the payor bank has engaged in wrongful self-help restitution,
exactly as in Triffin v. Mellon PSFS. The point is that the effect of the mid-
night deadline in requiring banks to make "prompt and effective decisions
on whether to pay or dishonor checks" is entirely independent of the avail-
ability of restitution in those cases where the bank has made the wrong
decision. A bank that dithers will be treated as if it had paid cash over the
counter.
So the real question is a broader one: whether the law of restitution
and the possibility of reversing a transaction to avoid unjust enrichment
impose unacceptable costs on our system of payments and commercial law
generally. Restitution for unjust enrichment based on mistaken payments
has been a feature of our legal system and its antecedents for some 350
years-put there by the hard-headed and efficiency-minded Lord Mans-
field-without any substantial evidence that it constitutes an obstacle to the
proper functioning of the payment system. Courts and commentators at-
tracted by the final payment fallacy tend to miss the fact that common-law
restitution is significantly self-limiting, through its self-imposed affirmative
defenses. The practical effect of the defenses allowed to bona fide credi-
tors,29 let alone to payees who (without giving value) have changed posi-
tion on receipt of the payment, is to clear a highway through the restitution
thicket that is broad enough to accommodate every transaction in the ordi-
nary course, and then some.
Restitution in payments cases works in much the same way as provi-
sional settlement. Because most checks are good, we pay them all, then
return the relative few that are bad. So long as we do this before the mid-
night deadline, revocation of settlement is no more and no less than (le-
gitimate) self-help restitution. Of the checks that are finally paid in this
way, only a tiny proportion-incomparably fewer than the percentage for
which settlement was revoked-will ever give rise to a viable claim in
restitution for mistaken payment. We concentrate our energies on the few
that do, deciding in that handful of cases whether the payor's claim is well
founded and whether the payees can assert affirmative defenses.
of the check under Section 4-215. Because the drawee bank already has paid such an item, it
cannot be "accountable" for the item under the terms of Section 4-302(a)(1). Thus, no dis-
honor occurs regardless of whether the drawee bank retains the check indefinitely or for some
reason returns the check after its midnight deadline.
U.C.C. § 3-502 cmt. 4 (2005).
29. See Andrew Kull, Defenses to Restitution: The Bona Fide Creditor, 81 B.U. L. REV. 919
(2001).
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The cost of restitution to the legal system is normally justified by the
goal of avoiding unjust enrichment, but its effect on the efficiency of the
payment system is presumably positive rather than the reverse. Restitution
is efficient for the same reason that provisional settlement is efficient. The
payor settles on presentation, without investigation, because he can revoke
the settlement for the items he does not want to pay. By the same token, we
are likely to get final payment faster if the law of restitution allows the
payor to reverse a mistake in the exceptional case. At both stages, and for
the same reasons, a system that encourages prompt payment with the pos-
sibility of restitution in some limited number of cases will operate more
smoothly than a system-frankly hard to imagine-in which every com-
pleted payment was made final without the possibility of recourse. Such a
system would concededly have the quality of "certainty," but the wait at the
teller's window (and its various electronic equivalents) would suddenly get
a lot longer.

